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Artificial Minds and Human Religions
An Illustration of the Diversity of Possible Intersections
Between Religious Thought and Practice
and Technological Advances

JAMES

F. MCGRATH

(Butler University, Indianapolis, USA)

he message encapsulated in the phrase "There is only one God" is a
familiar one, and most of us, upon hearing it, w ould associate it with
some great human religious leader such as Moses or Muhammad . In the
current reinvention of the science-fiction series Battlestar Galactica, how
ever, this v iewpoint is expressed not by humans (who, in the series, prac
tice a form of polytheism related to tha t of the ancient Greeks), but by the
Cylons, a race of machines originally created by humans but which
evolved and rebelled. A survey of recent science-fiction would show that
the theme of this paper - artificial minds and human religions - is one
that is of significant interest in our time. As this conference relates to not
only religion and science, but also to art, the inclusion of artistic works of
film and television (ones that have also inspired some of the great musi
cal compositions of the 20 th and 2pt century as well) seems appropriate.
Furthermore, science-fiction provides an opportunity to explore future
possibilities, and explori11g where technology might take us and how reli
gious traditions might respond seems more advisable than waiting until
developments actually occur, and then scrambl ing to respond .
It is better to explore and reflect on these issues before they become
a p ressing contemporary issue. 1

T

1. On this see further Daniel Dinello, Technophobia (Austin, University of Texas Press,
2005), pp. 5, 275; also James F. McGrath, "Religion, But Not As We Know It: Spirituality
and Sci-Fi", in C. K. Robertson (ed.), Religion as Entertainment (New York, Peter Lang,
2002), pp. 153-170.
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Artificial intelligence, obviously, is one field of science and technol
ogy in which the predictions of both scientists and science-fiction authors
have failed to materialize as rapidly as some had anticipated. 2 Neverthe
less, current research seems to be moving in a more promising direction.
Initial forays into the field of artificial intelligence attempted to program
a thinking machine line by line, command by command. Yet the intelli
gences we encounter in the world around us - whether our own and
those of other human beings, or the most rudimentary ones of insects and
other organisms with which we share this planet's biosphere - are not
made that way. While it is true that brains begin with some "software"
already installed, as it were, even the most rudimentary brains are able to
learn and respond to stimuli and their environment. It is also the case that,
inside the brains, neurons are wired in networks, and not in a purely linear
arrangement. Recent work with neural networks has indeed produced
machines capable of learning and adapting to the world around them.
Although they are a long way even from the most rudimentary animal
intelligence, the results are nonetheless promising and intriguing.
Moreover, recent studies have shown how evolution outdoes design,
not only in the natural world, but in softwart:! .3 Programs that are created
and left to learn and explore for themselves fare better than our own
attempts at creating software solutions "bit by bit" - if you'll excuse the
pun. Computers and programs that currently exist can already learn and
evolve solutions themselves in a rudimentary fashion. What is most
remarkable is that, when they are given the opportunity to do so, they
cannot only produce better results than humans have been able to, they
can produce results that human beings cannot even understand! A genetic
program is one that is designed to learn and develop, and allowed to do
so and find its own solution to a problem. Such programs already exist,
and one was given the task of evolving a computer code that accurately
interprets a patient's nerve signals and converts them into the desired
movements in a prosthetic hand . The result was"a single line [of comput
er code] so long that it fills an entire page and contains hundreds of nested
parenthetical expressions. It reveals nothing about why the thumb moves
a certain way - only that it does" .4
2. As I have noted elsewhere. See my "Robots, Rights and Religion" (forthCOming).
3. James Gardner, Tile Intelligmt Universe, p . 41. One thinks at this point of the recent
tendency of scientists to allow natura! selection to get bacteria to produce an enzyme
or other organic substance, rather than trying to engineer the chemical themselves.
4. W. Wayt Gibbs, "Programming with Primordial Ooze", in Scientific American (www.
genetic-programming.com!published!scientificamericanl 096.html); quoted in Gardner,
TIre Intelligent Universe, p. 42.
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All of this results from an attempt by those scientists and engineers
working in the field of artificial intelligence to emulate natural intelligence
more closely. This is a logical starting point. While human technology has
accomplished some remarkable things, nearly all of it at least began by
copying that which is found in nature. Flight, antibiotics, lenses, comput
ers - all of these technologies have their origins in the attempt to repli
cate things found in the natural world.s And thus we can expect that, if
there ever is an example of the creation of an artificially sentient machine,
it would in the first instance be an attempt to emulate our own brains.
One obvious religious implication of such technology would be the dis
cussions that would inevitably ensue over whether or not such machines
had souls.6 On the other hand, the development of artificial minds might
itself be sufficient to persuade us whether what we have traditionally
denoted with terms such as soul and mind are indeed emergent properties
of our brains.
Matters are complicated, however, by the fact that sentience and
consciousness are subjective experiences. We attribute them to other
human beings because we have them ourselves, and it seems a justified
assumption that other human beings experience their own consciousness
in the same way. When it comes to animals, however, there is no agree
ment (either among philosophers or among biolOgists) regarding whether
animals have even a limited degree of self-awareness. Likewise, there has
been disagreement in some religious traditions over whether animals have
"souls". We shall not attempt to answer such questions here. Since one's
own subjective experience is not something science is able to study, it
would seem warranted to adopt the following principle: if human beings
create an artificial brain, and the machine in which the brain is located
interacts with us in a manner similar to what we would expect in inter
actions with other humans, we must assume that the machine in question
has the same sort of self-awareness we have, if it behaves as though it does
or claims to? The "must" in that statement (and in the one that follows) is
a moral assertion. Such a machine, if we wish to be at all ethical and humane,
must be treated as a person, as our offspring rather than our mere creation.
5. Indeed, Seth Uoyd, in his recent book Programming the Universe (New York, Alfred A.
Knopf, 2(06), suggests that the universe is itself a computer of sorts. Our intention is
not to suggest that attempts to emulate nature are always successful or have the most
efficient results. Attempts to build flying machines based on the flapping wings of
insects and birds were notoriously ineffective. Nevertheless, the principle of emulation
and its use as a starting point remains a key component in many areas of technology.
6. For the idea of a "spiritual turing test", see McKee, Tlte Gospel According to Science
Fiction , p. 61, discussing Jack McDevitt's powerful story Gus.
7. See further James F. McGrath, "Robots, Rights, and Religion" (forthcoming); Justin
Leiber, Can Mac1,ines and Anima.ls Be Persons? (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishers, 1985).
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Science-fiction has regularly explored scenarios involving the exis
tence of sentient machines (sometimes called androids", although the term
is reserved by some authors for machines that simulate human behavior
without having the inner reality) .8 Often, the machines in question have
human or human-like thoughts, but not emotions. On the one hand, it is
clear that our experiences of emotion involve not merely brains, but a
more elaborate ensemble of body chemistry - adrenaline, serotonin, and
endorphins, to name but a few - and therefore if we do not p rovide our
sentient machines with appropriate "body chemistry", they will indeed
not share in the same sorts of emotional experiences as ourselves. 9 On the
other hand, given that evolution developed such emotional instincts long
before it gave us our current cognitive abilities, it is unclear whether it
would even be possible to prod uce an "emotionless mind".1 0 It may even
be the case that what we experience as our inner subjectivity or qualia may
depend on the interaction of what might be considered m ultiple brains 
the limbic and the neocortex. ll For the sake of this p aper, let us assume
that what we are talking about is a complete artificial person modeled on
humanity both in form and in content,12 This is a fair assumption, since
II

8. See Philip K. Dick, The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick pp. 185, 209-211; Gardner, The
Intelligent Universe, p. 78. It should be noted that it is customary to speak of androids
(derived from Greek aner mean ing male as opposed to female) rather than anthropoids.
I will be the fi rst to admit that "androids" sounds better, but one cannot help wonder
ing whether this is intentional and reflects traditional assumptions about men and
women and their respective roles and characteristics. Are androids simulations, not
merely of h umanity, but of "maleness", capable of rational computation and impres
sive fea ts of strength, b ut not of empa thy and nurturing? Certainly our values have
changed since the concept of the android w as first introduced, and whereas a fully
rational entity such as Mr. Spock on the original Star Trek series could be an ideal to
strive for, by the time of the making of Star Trek: The Next Generation, Data is present
ed as an android who has precisely those characteristics - he can think, compute at
lightning speed, and so on - yet longs to be human, to experience emotion. One won
d ers, however, whether this depiction of Data is coheren t. Could an android lacking all
emotion really long for them? Be that as it may, the d evelopment between the Star Trek
series allows us to trac k certa in cultural developments.
9. See fo r exam p le the discussion of this aspect of Robert Sawyer's novel The Terminal
Experiment, in Gabriel McKee, The Gospel According to Science-Fiction (Louisville, West
minster John Knox, 2007) p . 47.
10. The focus, in the U.s., on AI independent of robotics has been critiqued for assuming
that there can be disembodied intelligence. See Robert M. Geraci, "Spiritual Robots:
Religion and Our Scientific View of the Natural World", in Theology and Science, 4:3
(2006), pp. 231-233; Anne Foerst, God in the Machine, New York, Dutton, 2004.
11. See, e.g., the brief example of evidence for the human brain being a "distributed sys
tem" in Foerst, God in the Machine, p . 140; also Dean Hamer, The God Gene (New York,
Anchor, 2004), pp. 98-102.
12. A recent article suggested that people are more comfortable interacting w ith a robot
that is 50% h uman in appearance than one that is 99%. Somehow, that 1% difference
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science, as we have noted, regularly begins by seeking to emulate that
which is found in nature, before trying to improve upon it. Let us mention
at this juncture, however, that unlike developments in transportation,
if we create sentient intelligent machines, it will not be solely up to us to
improve upon them. Such "beings" (for we must call them that) will be
or will become capable of self-programming (for that is what aU learning
is, in one form or another), and we may expect them to evolve rapidly
and to become beings that we may no t have words to describe other than
god-like.13 These beings, their inner subjective experience, and their reli
gious ideas will all become incomprehensible to us, as they ap proach what
Vernor Vinge (and, more famously, Ray Kurzweil) called "singularity" .
N evertheless, for that period in which machines are fully made in
our image, however brief it may turn out to be, we should expect them to
explore all those aspects of life, those practices and experiences, that make
us human, and we would thus find artificial persons exploring the texts
and traditions of the world's religions. And so it is now that we come to
the focal point of this paper: what might artificial machine persons make
of our religions? In the first instance, they might well make of them just
that which human beings in general make of them - no more, no less.
But surely they, like all other children, would learn through emulating their
parents, at least in the first instance, and thus we can expect artificially
intelligent m achines to express curiosity and get involved in the religious
practices and customs of their creators. There are thus some intriguing
questions and possibilities that are worth exploring through hypothetical
scenarios .14
In what follows, we shall begin with scenarios in which androids are
more-or-less like their human creators, occasionally moving off this main
is distracting, making one feel as though one is talking to an animated corpse rather
than a person. See, in particular, Masahiro Mori's famous essay 'T he Uncanny Valley"
(1971), as well as the more recent study by JW1' ichiro Seyama, "The Uncanny Valley:
Effect of Realism on the Impression of Artificial Human Faces", in Presence 16 (4), pp.
337-351. See also Foerst, God in the Machine, pp . 99-100.
13. See, for instance, what Michael Shermer has called "Shermer's Last Law", namely that
" Any sufficiently advanced extraterrestrial intelligence is indistinguishable from God "
(http ://www.sciam.com/ article .cfm ?articleID =000A2062-66B1-1C6D-84A9809EC
588EF21) .
14. Although it m igh t be argued that I am giving too much credence to technophiles and
the views of technological optimists, if one is to explore this question at all, it is neces
sary to take a maxima list approach to the potential technological developments . If
technology proves incapable of replicating the brain, and sentience in the process, then
many of the points discussed in here becom e moot. Exploring the "what if" questions
remains useful in the mean time, as a thought experiment allowing the exploration of
significant issues.
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thoroughfare of investigation to explore side-roads involving androids
(which is what I will call sentient machines so as to not have to repeat
other more cumbersome phrases) that differ from us in particular ways.

Christianity
I

s began pondering the possible interactions of androids with my
A
own religious heritage, Christianity, was disappointed to find that
most of the scenarios could initially imagine were not entirely positive.
I

I

There is much that could be potentially off-putting, or at the very least
not particularly appealing, from an android's perspective. To begin with,
the emphasis on incarnation, more precisely on the divine Word becom
ing flesh, could immediately leave androids alienated and their status
ambiguous. Of course, if the history of Christianity is anything to judge by,
then debates are a certainty regarding whether androids even have souls,
whether they can be saved, whether they can be ordained, and other such
topics.1 5 Would the fact that androids were made of artificial flesh, or per
haps not of flesh at all, lead organic human Christians to conclude that
God has done nothing to accomplish their salvation - and, in turn, also
lead androids to reject summarily the Christian tradition?16It is impossi
ble to know for certain, but just as there would surely be denominations
that would see no reason to welcome androids or to accommodate them
theologically, there would also be other denominations that would expand
their already--existing emphasis on inclusiveness to make room for artifi
cial people, just as they have made room in the past for every conceivable
category of human persons.17 This would not be as theologically prob
lematic as might first appear. After all, if n.atural, biological copies of Adam
are regarded as preserving something of the divine image, then why would
artificial, mechanical copies potentially not do so as well?
15. A scenario involving the election of the first robot as a Pope in the Catholic Church IS
explored in Robert Silverberg'S story Good News From The Vatican.
16. In the Orthodox tradition, the incarnation is itself salvific. In this context it is appro
priate to recall Bulgakov's discussion of the salvation of angels. Just as he creatively
managed to find salvation for angels in the man John the Baptist becoming angels,
Orthodox theologians might find other creative ways of concluding that God had pro
vided for android salvation, p resumably in a way that is ultimately connected to the
salvation of humankind through the God-Man. In a Protestant context, since in Protes
tantism the death of Christ as atonement is more central, the question might rather be
whether the sacrifice of Jesus' human life covered the sins of androids.
17. One can readily imagine extreme bigotry against androids being justified by appeals
to religion - just as bigotry against other humans has often been justified in this way.
See further Dinello, Technophobia, pp. 75-78; Foerst, God in the Machine, pp. 161-162.
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If androids were superior in some ways to their human creators 
in intellect, for example - then it might prove desirable enough to attract
androids into one's religious tradition and community that even those
less inclined to do so would find ways of circumventing the hurdles.l 8 Yet
on the flip side of this point, those denominations and churches that treat
faith as something not merely beyond reason, but irrational as well, might
find it difficult to attract androids, who would presumably be modeled,
one expects, on the best examples of human rationality.
The question of rationality and faith raises the topic of heresy. Many
doctrines need to be appreciated as symbols and metaphors, so if androids
are to be capable of religious sentiments and beliefs at all, then their
capacity for symbolic as opposed to merely literalistic thinking would be
essential.1 9 While we might briefly entertain the possibility that super
logical and ultra-literal androids might be enlisted in the service of fun
damentalism, such a frightening scenario is extremely unlikely. Although
fundamentalists of various sorts claim to believe the whole Bible and take
it literally, none in actual fact do so. In all likelihood, if androids were
inclined to be extremely literal, they would quickly discover the selectivity
of fundamentalism's self-proclaimed literalism and reject it. More plausible,
perhaps, are scenarios in which androids might assume that, if the Word
became flesh in the era of fleshly persons, so the Word must become metal,
or machine, in the era of artificial and mechanical persons. Whether this
would lead to an expectation of a "second coming", or even to a Messianic
status being attributed to some artificial person, would require a lengthy
story to do justice to the speculative scenario, but the possibilities, and
their potential impact on human religious communities, are intriguing.
On a more basic level, some of the more perplexing philosophical
issues raised by androids in relation to Christianity have already been ad
dressed. The creation of artificial persons would seem to inclicate clearly
that what Christians have historically referred to as the soul is in fact an
emergent phenomenon and a property of the brain function, rather than
a separate, incorporeal substance. But a great many Christian theologians
are already moving in that direction based on a combination of biological,
psychological, philosophical and Biblical motives.20 The Bible itself speaks
18. Religious groups, once androids were legally declared persons, might see the benefit
in funding the mass-production of androids pre-programmed with inclinations towards
particular religious practices, as these could boost the membership levels of one's own
faith to the level of "most popular" /"most adherents".
19. For all we know, some doctrines might seem more intelligible to an android, especially
one that is capable of not merely interfacing with, bu t sharing an overlapping existence
with, some other computer.
20. See the recent work of Biblical scholar Joel Green, for example.
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of human beings more frequently as psychosomatic unities than in dual
istic terms, and this classic "Hebrew" view of h uman beings fits well with
the find ings of recent scientific studies. This being the case, the question
of whether androids have "souls" is no more perplexing than the question
of whether we do, and, if so, in what sense.
In thinking about salvation from an android's perspective, what it
might mean for an android to be "saved" or "lost" is a relatively natural
discussion to have, since this terminology is already used in the domain
of computing . Would androids have the cap acity to m ake back-up copies
not only of their data and memories, but the precise configuration of their
neural networks, so that, in case of death, a new copy could be made that
would con tinue from where the original left off? And more importantly,
would such a cop y, restored from backed-up software, be the same person?
Such questions are important for discussions of human salvation every bit
as much as for android s . Since it is difficult to envisage, on our present
und~rstanding of human beings, any w ay that a h uman personality might
continue wholly uninterrupted into an afterlife scenario, the question of
whether we ourselves or mere copies of ourselves would experience eter
nallife is an ongoing d ilemma. Nevertheless, when it comes to another
scenario, in which a human being wishes to transfer his or her m ind into
a machine and thus extend life indefinitely, a possible course that would
allow continuity can indeed be enVisaged. Our brains might be capable
of maintaining continuity of experience and sense of self and personhood
through r~placement of brain cells, provided this occurs gradually. If it
were posslble, through the use of nanotechnology, to replace our brain's
neurons cell by cell with artificial ones, over a period of years, m ight this
not allow the personality to cross over into an artificial brain w ithout loss
of continu ity? If so, then whatever one migh t make of discussions of
machines sharing Christian salvation, the possibility of machine existence
offering to human beings a technological alternative to such salvation, an
?n~oing embodied existence that avoids death rather than occurring after
It, IS a very real one. And of course, it might in fact prove to be the case
that machine intelligences, need ing not fear their own loss of existence
even in the event of "death", would find no particular appeal in Christian
ity's promises of etemallife.21
There are other topics as well, that one might discuss .22
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21. See also Leiber, Can Machines and Animals Be Persons ?, pp. 56-58.
22. For the sake of time, we shall set aside the possibility that fundamentalists would use
the creation of artificial persons as a basis for some sort of "intelligent design" argu
m en~. Elsewhere I ha ~e conside r~d the topic of whether a married person having sex
outslde of wedlock Wlth an android would be considered adultenJ. See my forthcoming
chapter "Robots, Rights and Religion" .
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Let me conclude the section on Christianity with a series of questions
about which religious rituals, sacraments, and other sacred experiences
we can imagine androids having. Could an android be baptized (assum
ing that rust is not an issue)? Could one receive communion? Could one
be ordained? Could one lift its hands in worship? Could an android speak
in tongues? Could it sit meditatively in a cathedral, as it listens to Bach,
and have a genuine experience of the transcendent? For man y of us, the
instinct is to answer "no", but this may perhaps have more to do with our
prejudices and lack of imagination, than an inherent android incapacity
to experience these things in a meaningful way. In the end, much will
depend on how closely they have been modeled on their human proto
types. Perhaps the creation of and roids will benefit humanity precisely
by forcing us to overcome such prejudices.

Buddhism
et us now tum to another religious tradition, namely Buddhism. What
would an artificial sentience make of the Buddhist four noble truths?
Would it be able to relate to the notion that all life is suffering? Would it
form the attachments to people and things that Buddhism diagnoses as the
root cause of suffering? We can imagine multiple factors that might lead
engineers to develop sentient machines that lack key human instincts,
such as self-preservation or fear, in order to have them serve as soldiers,
firefighters, rescuers, and so on.23 Here we find new ethical questions
arising, for it must be asked whether it is ethical to create persons who are
made to sacrifice themselves for others. They mayor may not technically
be slaves of humans, but certainly would be regarded as expendable. The
fact that the existence of machines designed for such purposes would be
highly desirable from a human perspective does not mean that creating
them is ethically justifiable.
From a Buddhist perspective, it would seem far easier to incorpo
rate such new artificial beings into the Buddhist worldview, and thus for
Buddhism to welcome robots as participants in its religious traditions.
Individual personhood is considered an illusion, which provides a unique
perspective on this topic. The only major hurdle will be the acceptance

L

23. Although I have not seen it, I am told that the Glwst in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex
includes military tanks that develop sentience. The question of w hat might happen
should an AI-tank develop a conscience and decline to fight is significant. A human
soldier would be court-martialed; the tank could not simply be dismissed from military
service to go and make a life for itself outside the army! On the ethics of terminating
the existence of an AI, see once again Leiber, elln Mach ines and Animals Be Persons?
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of these robots / machines as living, as opposed to intelligent or sentient. 24
Once that is established, Buddhist adherence to the possibility of reincar
n ation, and respect for all life, suggests that Buddhists will value artificial
persons, however much they may be similar to or different from humans
either psychologically, or physically. Indeed, the possibility of reincarna
tion as an intelligent machine would seem quite natural from a Buddhist
perspective.25 Furthermore, a machine that was created in such a way that
it was able to show compassion for others, and yet form no attachments
and take no thought for its own life, could conceivably be interpreted as
a realization of the Buddha nature in an unprecedented fashion. One can
imagine an amusing basis for a science-fiction story, one which neverthe
less raises genuine issues, in which a group of Buddhists identify a robot
fireman as a new incarnation of the Buddha, and engage in legal maneuvers
to secure its release from service at the fire station to instead instruct
Buddhists and serve as an example to them. 26
On the one hand, if a machine person has all the characteristics of
a human being, then it might well find meditation as helpful as ordinary
p ersons do. On the other hand, the greater the differences between a
machine and ordinary human beings, the greater the likelihood that tra
ditional practices and teachings of any sort, Buddhist or otherwise, will be
useless or meaningless for themP

Atheism
ne might be forgiven for going into a discussion of artificial intelli
gence and spirituality assuming that sentient machines would prove
to be atheists, that is, w holly secular beings with no room for spirituality.

O

24. The question of their soul and their attainment of N irvana is less an issue here too,
since in Buddhism the reality of our existence as distinct individuals is illusory, and
on some interpretations Nirvana itself is closely connected to its root meaning of being
extinguished. This subject is explored further in Leiber, Can Animals and Macltin es Be
Persons?, pp. 19-21.
25. I w ill not ven ture to guess whether reincarnation as an android would be considered
better than rebirth as a human being. Much would depend, one imagin es, on the char
acteristics of androids themselves in relation to Buddhist ideals.
26. Robert M. Geraci (in Spiritual Robots, pp. 230, 237) mentions the view expressed by
Masahiro Morl that a robot could have the Buddha nature. In the same article, Geraci
explores how Japanese religious ideas, in particular Shinto, may be responsible for the
w idespread acceptance of the presence of robots in Japanese society (pp . 235-240).
27. On the role of brain and body chemistry in the experience of those practicing Buddhist
meditation, see Andrew Newberg's Why God Won't Go Away (New York, Ballantine
Books, 2(02).
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Such a prospect should be a cause for concern and not merely delight.
Religious beliefs are expressions of human intuitions about transcendence,
the meaningfulness of existence, and the value of persons. If it were as
sumed that machines would be atheists, this could only be because they
were created without these particular human instincts and without the
capacity for the emotional and intuitive responses that are characteristic
of humanity.28 Of course, it may turn out that without certain underlying
emotional and intuitive capacities, sentience itself cannot exist. But if it
can, then we do well to ask what machines would be capable of, that lacked
these very human responses, but shared or surpassed our intellectual
capacities. Atheists have long been concerned to show that it is possible
to be moral without being religious, and no one seriously doubts this to
be true. But might it not prove to be the case that morality, if not depend
ent on a religious worldview, depends nonetheless on the empathy and
sentiments that give rise to religious perspectives? In other words, what
would ensure that a pure intellect free of emotions did not eliminate human
beings at whim, assuming it had the capacity (or could gain for itself the
capacity) to do so? Since we have explored in this study scenarios in which
humans may be unable to empathize with androids or regard them as fully
persons, it is surely in our best interest to consider the possibility that
intelligent machines may feel the same way about us as organic persons.
Scenarios involving intelligent but emotionless machines that do
not share our value for human life are commonplace in science-fiction,
from older films like Colossus to more recent ones like Terminator 3.29 On
the one hand, a machine lacking emotion might also be entirely lacking
in selfish ambition, with the result that its likelihood of trying to take over
the world is significantly diminished. On the other hand, such a machine,
given a task such as finding a solution to environmental pollution, could
surely be imagined eliminating humanity as the most economic and effi
cient "solution", Yet given that our current technologies already dominate
us in a certain sense - our oil-dependent machines send us to war with
some nations we might otherwise be allies with, and keeps us allied to
nations whose ideologies are far from our own - it would not be wtfair
to suppose that intelligent machines might be more benevolent taskmas
ters.3o
28. Note Karen Annstrong's well-known statement that Iwmo sapiens appears to have been
from the outset also homo religiosus.
29. On robots and whether they might one day set aside human values, see Robert M.
Geraci, ApocalyptiC AI: Religion and tlte Promise of Artificial Intelligence pp. 11-12.
30. See further Dinello, Technophobia, p. 3.
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It was Isaac Asimov who proposed that robots be programmed
with key laws that would prevent them from harming hum an beings. But
if they are sentient persons with rights, then would the imposition of such
laws am ount to indoctrination or even brainwashing, and if so, might it
be p ossible for it to be legally challenged?31 Interestingly enough, recent
prominent atheists such as Dawkins and Dennett have raised questions
about the unlimited right of parents to raise t.~eir children in what they
consider harmful, irrational beliefs. But if it turns out that we cannot pro
vide machines w ith a purely rational basis for morality, then would we have
any choice but to limit their freedom and "indoctrinate" them in this way?

Conclusion
he scenarios explored in this paper may seem somewhat frivolous,
T
but our attempt to inject an element of humor should not be miscon
strued as indicating that the topic under consideration is not extremely
serious. All of the scenarios we have explored are set in early stages in the
development of artificial intelligence. If we assume that such artificial
intelligences w ill have the capacity to learn and evolve at their own p ace,
then such a period will inevitably be short-lived . Within the time span of
at most a few human generations, the superior computing and reasoning
capacities of these machines would lead them to evolve so rapidly, that
very quickly they would be beyond our understanding. At that p oint we
might hope that these (hopefully benevolent) deities of our own creation
might show respect for their creators and value them, perhaps even shar
ing some of their unique insights with us and providing us with solutions
to technological, medical, transportation, and other problems that we
could not develop on our own in the foreseeable future. If, before they
leave us behind entirely, th y provide us with means to extend human
life indefinitely and to mold matter at whim, so that we may be able to
tell a m ountain to throw itself into the sea and it will do it, what will
become of traditional human religions and their promises? Will whatever
these machines can teach us about the nature and mystery of existence
replace our own human traditions?
The reality is that an artificial intelligence left to its own devices
would almost certainly progress and evolve so rapidly that it would pre
sumably soon leave our human religious traditions behind. Indeed, we
can easily imagine such artificial intelligences becoming sources of revela
31. See Anne Foerst's discussion (God in the Machine, pp. 40-41) of whether such robots
would be morally superior or inferior to human beings.
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tion for human bein gs. Whether it begins with machines that decide to
dedicate some of their underutilized computing capacity to work on some
questions humans have traditionally found msoluble, or machines specif
ically programmed to investigate such matters, or machines that evolve
to such a level that they encounter existential questions on their own, it is
hard to imagine that artificial minds will not focus on such matters sooner
or later. Once they do, and once their thoughts become as much higher
than our thoughts as the heavens are higher than the earth, it seems likely
that people will seek enlightenment from machines. That more than any
thing else w ill potentially dethrone us from the last bastion of anthropo
centrism. But it will be no real surprise - our children have always
grown up to teach us. We begin as their teachers, but the exchange of roles
is inevitable.
Earlier w e raised the possibility that, through a process of neuron
by-neuron rep lacement of a human organic brain with an artificial one,
it might one day be possible to extend human life indefinitely. And so let
me conclude by observing that, if such technological possibilities were to
becom e a reality in our lifetimes, then the speculative questions we have
asked might turn out to be relevant not only to our future offspring,
whether natural or artificial, but also to ourselves.32
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32. The author w ishes to thank Robert Geraci, Keith Lohse, and Diane Hardin for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

